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Recent Developments

Divergent Views as to Applicability to National
Banks of State Restrictions on Home-City
Branching-Walker Bank & Trust Co. v.
Saxon*; Commercial Security Bank
v. Saxon**
Two recent federal court decisions have brought into question
for the first time the degree to which the federal law permitting the

* 234 F. Supp. 74 (D. Utah 1964).
" 236 F. Supp. 457 (D.D.C. 1964).
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establishment of branches by national banks' incorporates state law
restrictions upon the establishment of branches within a city in
which the branching bank is already located. In Walker Bank &
Trust Co. v. Saxon,2 a national bank sought to branch within its
home city of Logan, Utah. In addition to the applicant's main
office, there were branches of two other banks in the city. The
applicant national bank in Commercial Security Bank v. Saxon8 and
the complaining state bank had their principal offices and one branch
in Ogden, Utah, the city in which the applicant sought to establish
an additional branch. Two other state banks had their principal
offices in that city.
The power of national banks to establish branches is governed
by 12 U.S.C. § 36(c), 4 clause (1) of which permits a bank to establish
branches within its home city if such branching is expressly authorized to state banks by state law. 5 Utah law permits the establishment
of new branches in cities with populations below ninety thousand
only if there is no bank located and regularly transacting business
there; if there is, however, branches may be acquired by taking
over an existing main office, but not by taking over a branch bank.0
Of course, in all home-city branching situations there is a bank
located and doing business in the city-the branching bank itself.
Neither applicant bank complied with the Utah statute. Nevertheless, the Comptroller of the Currency argued in both cases that
if under any circumstances, whether or not in fact existent, a state
bank could establish a branch in a particular city, then a national
bank's application for permission to establish a branch may be approved regardlessof its compliance with the specific standards of state
law. In Walker, the United States District Court in Utah held that
the Comptroller was not bound by the specific restrictions of Utah
law since that state "expressly authorized" the establishment by state
1. 44 Stat. 1228 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1964).
2. 234 F. Supp. 74 (D. Utah 1964).
3. 236 F. Supp. 457 (D.D.C. 1964).

4. "A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of
the Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) within the limits of the city, town
or village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation
are at the time expressly authorized to state banks by the law of the state in question, and (2) at any point within the state in which said association is situated, if such
establishment and operation are at the time authorized to state banks by the statute
law of the state in question by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively, and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions
as to location imposed by the law of the state on state banks

....

"

44 Stat. 1228

(1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 86(c) (1964).
5. Ibid.
6. UTA CODE ANN. § 7-3-6 (Supp. 1965) provides in part: "Except in cities [below
90,000 in population], or within unincorporated areas of a county in which [such a
city] is located, no branch bank shall be established in any city or town in which is
located a bank or banks, state or national, regularly transacting a customary banking
business, unless the bank seeking to establish such branch shall take over an existing
bank."
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banks of branches in the city in question. 7 However, in Commercial
Security Bank, the United States District Court in the District of
Columbia enjoined the Comptroller from authorizing the establishment of a branch bank, holding that the exact standards of the Utah
branching law must be applied to the national banks.8
The court in Walker relied on the familiar rule that a statute
is to be construed so that no part is superfluousP In providing for the
establishment of branches outside the bank's home city, clause (2)
of section 36(c) states specifically that the establishment is subject
to all restrictions as to location imposed by state law. 10 The lack of
similar language in the first clause was construed by the court to
indicate that Congress did not intend home-city branching to be
subject to the state law restrictions on location.' Because the Utah
prohibition on new branches in cities with existing facilities may
be viewed as "a restriction as to location," the court's argument might
seem persuasive. On the other hand, the Utah statute can be read
as more than a restriction as to location; in practical effect it is an
absolute prohibition on branching outside of Salt Lake County ex12
cept by the acquisition of the principal office of another bank.
Thus, no branching is permitted state banks situated similarly to
the national bank in Walker,13 and in Commercial Security Bank
no state bank could have established a branch in addition to the
existing banking facilities. Furthermore, although the state statutory
proscription may be unreasonable, 14 the Utah legislature has reaffirmed this restrictive view, despite the action of the Utah Commissioner of Banking in approving branching applications that did
not comply with the statute. 15
While the argument in Walker cannot be ignored, the legislative
history of the McFadden Act of 1927,16 which substantially embodied
clause (1) of the present section, 17 would appear to support the
7. 234 F. Supp. at 77.
8. 236 F. Supp. at 461.

9. See, e.g., SUTHRLAND, STATUTORY CONSrwcrUoN 339 (3d ed. 1943). However, "the
intention prevails over the letter, and the letter must if possible be read so as to
conform to the spirit of the act." Ibid.'
10. 48 Stat. 189 (1933), as amended, 12 U.s.C. § 36(c)(2) (1964).
11. Similarly, § 36(c) explicitly makes state minimum capital requirements applicable to out-of-town branches of national banks. 66 Stat. 633 (1952), 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)
(1964). It seems dear that state capital requirements are not applicable to home-city
branches. Bell, National Bank Branches-The Authority To Approve and To Challenge, 82 BANKING L.J. 1 (1965).
12. See text accompanying note 6 supra; Walker Bank & Trust v. Taylor, 15 Utah
2d 234, 390 P.2d 592 (1964); Note, Branch Banking in Utah-Legal and Economic
Analysis, 9 UTAH L. REv. 372, 377-78, 384-86 (1965).
13. Walker Bank & Trust v. Taylor, supra note 12.
14. Id. at 237, 390 P.2d at 595. See Note, supra note 12, at 386.
15. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7-3-6.1, -6.2, -6.3 (Supp. 1965). See generally Walker Bank
& Trust Co. v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 238, 390 P.2d 592, 595 (1964).
16. 44 Stat. 1228 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)(1) (1964).
17. The relevant clause of the McFadden Act read, "if such establishment and
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reasoning in Commercial Security Bank. Lacking statutory authority
to branch, the national banks were unable to reach financial resources available to state banks through branching; 18 the resulting
imbalance threatened to destroy the national banks. 19 The passage
of the McFadden Act was urged, therefore, to restore a workable
competitive equality.20 Although essentially opposed to branch
banking, 21 Congress decided that home-city branching, which did
not carry the same stigma as state-wide branching, 22 should be a
question of local policy, subject to the control of the various state
legislatures. 23 Although there is meager contemporary authority
to indicate the precise extent to which Congress intended the
specific restrictions of state law to be applicable to the branching
of a national bank, there is some support for the Commercial
Security Bank interpretation. The Senate sponsor of the bill was
of the view that the limitation to two branches in Massachusetts
law would ipso facto apply to the national banks there,2 4 and similar
views were expressed by the Attorney General in 1930 and 1931
operation are at the same time permitted to state banks by the law of the state in
question." (Emphasis added.) "Permitted" was changed to "expressly authorized" in
1933. See note 35 infra.
18. Comment, 8 VILL. L. REv. 209, 212-15 (1963). For general discussions of branch
banking prior to 1927, see BRADFORD, Ti LEGAL STATUS OF BRANCH BANKING IN THE
UNITED STATES 1-16 (1940); CHAP"AN & WESTERFIELD, BRANCH BANKING 84-108 (1942);
10 vA. L. REv. 548 (1924).
19. See 1924 COMPTROTIER OF TBE CURRENCY ANN. REP. 4; 16 J. Am. BANKERS'
AsS'N 450 (1924).
20. H.R. REP. No. 83, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1926). Congressional intent to maintain a competitive equality in state and national branch banking was recently reaffirmed by passage of the 1962 amendment to 12 U.S.C. § 36(b), which explicitly
stated that a national bank stands in the shoes of a state bank in several banking
situations. 76 Stat. 667 (1962). See generally Bell, supra note 11.
21. S.REP. No. 473, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1926); BRADFORD, op. cit. supra note
18, at 15-16; Paton, The McFadden Bill Without the Hull Amendments, 19 J. Am.
BANKERS' AWS'N 432, 433 (1926). Although the Comptroller of the Currency was antagonistic toward branch banking, he urged passage of the McFadden Bill. 1925
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANN. REP. 2.

22. See BRADFORD, op. cit. supra note 18, at 15-16. See generally Breckenridge,
Constitutionality of Federal Branch Bank Legislation, 19 ILL. L. REv. 629, 630 n.6
(1925).
23. Collins, How Far Apart Are the Senate and House on the McFadden Bill?,
19 J. Am. BANKERS' Ass'N 67, 107 (1926). The so-called "Hull Amendments" would
have prohibited a national bank from branching in a state that amended its law after
the passage of the McFadden Act to permit state banks to branch. H.R. REr. No. 83,
69th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1926). The Senate viewed this as an unwarranted intervention
into state concerns. S.REP'. No. 473, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 9-10 (1926); 68 CoNG. REc. 8576
(1927) (remarks of Senator Pepper). The Senate view prevailed. See generally CurmbLAN & WzsrErrmn, op. cit. supra note 18, at 104-07; Paton, The McFadden Bill and
Branch Banking, 18 J. Am. BANKERS' Ass'N 257 (1925).
24. 68 CONG. REc. 3576 (1927) (remarks of Senator Pepper). "This proposed law
does not authorize a national bank to establish any more branches, even within the
municipal area, than are permitted under the law of the state . . . ." Ibid. Senator
Pepper's interrogator did not share his view of the bill, nor did another senator. Id. at
3576 (remarks of Senator Walsh); id. at 5650 (remarks of Senator Wheeler).
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regarding a Georgia law prohibiting branches in cities under a
certain population 5 and a South Dakota law prohibiting branches
in towns with established banking institutions.26 Thus, the early
interpretation of the section which now constitutes the first clause
of section 86 (c) would indicate that national banks are to be
subject to all state statutes imposing specific prohibitions on branch
banking. 27 To hold otherwise would tend to reverse the competitive
imbalance, because national banks could establish home-city
branches where state banks would be specifically prevented from
so doing.2 8 In light of the legislative history of the McFadden Act,

the resultant pressure on the states to liberalize their branching
laws would be unjustified.2
Furthermore, there was no shift in legislative purpose between
the enactment of clause (1) and of clause (2) which would warrant
the different interpretation of the clauses suggested in Walker.80
While the McFadden Act permitted only home-city branches, the
National Banking Act of 1933 s ' relaxed that limitation by allowing
inter-city branching, but only to the extent permitted state banks
by state laws. 8 2 As originally proposed, clause (2) would have permitted state-wide branch banking by national banks regardless of
any prohibition in state law;38 however, this proposal was criticized
as supplanting with a national branch banking system the McFadden
Act's policy of leaving branch banking generally under state controls.8 4 In its place, therefore, an amendment was accepted author25. 36 Ops. Arr'Y GEN. 344 (1930).
26. 36 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 450 (1931).
27. It has been suggested that the Comptroller must follow the state statutory
provisions as to location and number of branches. Bell, Branches of National BanksRecent Cases on Review of Decisions of Comptroller of the Currency, 78 BANKING LJ.
220, 224 (1961). National Bank v. Wayne Oakland Bank, 252 F.2d 537 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958), and Commercial State Bank v. Gidney, 174 F. Supp. 770
(D.D.C. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 278 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1960), were cited as authority
for this suggestion and were said to apply to any specific, nondiscretionary, statutory
circumscription of branch banking. Bell, supra, at 224. However, state capital requirements for intra-city branches may be beyond the scope of this limitation. See note
19 supra.
28. Commercial Sec. Bank v. Saxon, 236 F. Supp. 457, 461 (D.D.C. 1964).

29. Id. at 461. It has been recognized that the Walker decision may undermine
Utah law and that it wil tend to create a strong impetus for changing that law.
Note, Branch Banking in Utah-Legal and Economic Analysis, 9 UTAH L. REv. 372,
389 (1964).
30. 234 F. Supp. at 78. The court in Commercial Security Bank concluded that
although the language varied, the ciauses should be interpreted similarly because the
underlying purpose of each was to establish competitive equality. 236 F. Supp. at 461.
31. 48 Stat. 189 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)(2) (1964).
32. Ibid. For a discussion of the history of branch banking in the United States
through the National Banking Act of 1933, see BRADFORD, op. cit. supra note 18;
CHAPMAN & WESIrEPiLD, op. cit. supra note 18; Comment, 8 VmL. L. REv. 209 (1963).
33. S. REP. No. 584, 72d Cong., 1st Seass. 16 (1932).
34. Comment, Federalism in Interpretation of Branch Banking Legislation, 32

U. CHm. L. REv. 148, 160 (1964). See also 76 CONG. R1Ec. 1449 (1933) (remarks of Senator Bratton). See generally 37 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 325, 326-28 (1933).
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izing branch banks only when "permitted" to state banks by the law
of the state. The amendment was perfected to read "expressly
authorized," in order to ensure that branch banks would not be
permitted "unless the legislature or the people themselves, through
an initiative, actually by law say that they shall be permitted here."' ' 5
Finally, "subject to the restrictions as to location" was added, although the rationale behind this addition does not readily appear. 0
It is therefore suggested that there is no difference between the
clauses sufficient to warrant the application of statutory proscriptions
as to inter-city but not home-city branching by national banks. As
has been said with regard to clause (2), a national bank should have
no greater right with respect to the location of branches than would
87
a similarly located state bank.
Home-city branching is but a minor aspect of the overall branching controversy, which has recently been intensified by population
shifts to suburban areas. 8 It has not met with the same resistance
as inter-city branching, and only two other states limit home-city
branching in a fashion similar to Utah.89 The Comptroller of the
35. 76 CONG. Rrc. 1997 (1933) (remarks of Senator Wheeler). Presumably for the
same reason, the language in clause (1) was changed to its present form by the Banking Act of 1933, which embodied the proposal under discussion. Without explanation,
the conference committee rewrote clause (2) into its present form by striking the word
"expressly," modifying "law" with "statute," and adding the phrase "by language
specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or
recognition." 37 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 325, 328 (1933).
36. Senator Blaine asked Senator Bratton whether the language, "and under restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the state on state banks," was embraced in his proposed amendment. Senator Bratton replied that it was not included
in the text as he read it, but he was agreeable to it as an amendment. 76 CONG. REc.
2079 (1933). Senator Bratton subsequently changed his amendment to include that
language. 76 CONG. R C. 2205 (1933).
37. See National Bank v. Wayne Oakland Bank, 252 F.2d 537 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958); South Dakota v. National Bank, 219 F. Supp. 842 (D.S.D.
1963), aff'd, 335 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1964); Suburban Trust Co. v. National Bank, 211
F. Supp. 694 (D.NJ. 1962); Commercial State Bank v. Gidney, 174 F. Supp. 770
(D.D.C. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 278 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1960). The plaintiffs in both
Walker and Commercial Security Bank cited these cases as authority for the proposition that Utah laws must be complied with fully. The court in Walker distinguished
these cases as constructions of clause (2), 234 F. Supp. at 78; however, the court in
Commercial Security Bank found them apposite, 236 F. Supp. at 461. Union Savings
Bank v. Saxon, 335 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1964), has been deemed contrary to Walker.
82 BANING LJ. 111, 117 (1965). That case, however, was an interpretation of
clause (2).
38. See generally Comment, Branch Banking-The Current Controversy, 16 STAN.
L. REv. 983 (1964); Comment, supra note 34; Sheehan, What's Rocking Those Rocks,
the Banks?, Fortune, Oct. 1963, p. 108.
39. ORE. Rev. STAT. § 714.050 (1963); S.D. CODE § 6.0402 (Supp. 1960). Washington,
while permitting home-city branch banking, restricts inter-city branching in language similar to the Utah restriction. W~M. Rev. CODE ANN. § 30.40.020 (1961).
Seven states limit home-city branching: ALA. CODE tit. 5, § 125(1) (1960) (only in counties over 200,000 population); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-59 (1960) (number of
branches limited according to capital and surplus of bank); HAWMI REv. LAws § 17839 (Supp. 1963) (number of branches limited according to bank zone); IND. ANN.
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Currency has sought amendment of the branching provisions to
free national banks entirely from state branching restrictions, which
he feels frustrate national economic growth and preserve "pockets
of monopoly" in the banking industry. 40 The Comptroller argues
that branch banking is preferable to the establishment of new banks
in meeting the need for adequate, convenient banking facilities in
areas of recent population growth, as well as in providing desirable
41
competition.
Notwithstanding the Comptroller's position and the contrast in
language within section 36(c), Congress has clearly deferred to state
policy in permitting branch banking, both inside and outside the
home city. In light of the congressional intent to equalize compedtive conditions between the state and national banks, and because
of the resultant pressures on state legislatures if the Walker rationale were to prevail, it would appear that the better view regarding
the interpretation of clause (1) is represented by the reasoning of
the court in Cormercial Security Bank.

STAT. § 18-1707 (1964) (number of branches limited according to capital and surplus
and size of city); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6:244 (1951) (2 branches in parish of domicile); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5228 (1957) (when population not less than 10,000); Omo
REv. CoDe ANN. § 1103.09 (Page 1954) (only as designated in articles of incorporation
except in a contiguous municipality or pther parts of county of domicile). Sixteen
states prohibit branch banking. See Comment, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 148, 150 n.11 (1964).

In addition to the above, thirteen states put significant limits on the location of
branches. Id. at 150 n.12.
40. Hearings on Conflict of Federal and State Banking Laws Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 276-78, 372 (1963).

41. Ibid. See generally authorities cited supra note 36. It is unlikely that the
Comptroller will be successful. Comment, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 148 n.3 (1964). But see
Comment, 16 STAN. L. REv. 983, 995 (1964). It should be noted that other alternatives
for expansion, e.g., chain and group banking, are available in lieu of direct branching. See the authorities cited supra note 88; Bell, supra note 11.

